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I. INTRODUCTION

Incrementally, the federal courts have eroded the rights of patent holders
wishing to license their patents. They have done so through judicial decisions that
have favored the patent licensee in patent license negotiations.! Negotiating a
patent license between a patent holder and prospective licensee is arduous.' Each
party seeks the advantage.3 Even after the licensing agreement is formed and the
licensee starts to benefit from the use of the patented invention, the parties often
pursue strategies designed to gain further advantage A licensee who questions
the validity of the patent can seek to invalidate the patent to avoid paying license
fees.5 Until 1969, a patent holder could insert a no-challenge clause in the
licensing agreement to ensure that the licensee would not sue over the validity of
the patent. 6 Such a provision ensured that the patent holder and licensee would
avoid the expensive litigation that resulted when a licensee would bring suit. The
elimination of these costs would be reflected in lower licensing payments by the
licensee.7
However, in 1969, the Supreme Court in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins invalidated nochallenge clauses in patent licensing agreements.8 This decision stripped patent
holders of an important weapon in their bargaining arsenals. The decision
remains an unprecedented intrusion into a patent holder's ability to license his
patent. The decision not only harmed patent holders, but, as this Note will
examine, it also harmed both licensees and the public at large. The Leardecision
defied the established goals of the patent system.
Yet Lear has remained the law for more than thirty-five years. Despite the
erosion of patent holders' ability to freely contract, courts still offered them some
protection against licensees seeking to invalidate patents through the Declaratory
Judgment Act. The DeclaratoryJudgment Act requires that a licensee seeking to
invalidate a licensed patent establish that there is a "case of actual controversy"
to allow a court to determine the patent's validity.9 Before the Supreme Court's
decision in Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.," ° a licensee, in order to establish a
case of actual controversy under the DeclaratoryJudgment Act, had to breach the

' See infra Part II.
2 See infra Part VI.
3 See infra Part VI.
4 See infra Part VI.
5 See infra Part I.
6 See infra Part VI.
7 See infra Part VII.
8

395 U.S. 653 (1969).

9 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (a)(2006).

,0 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
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license agreement and subsequently challenge the validity of the patent." The
Declaratory Judgment Act protected patent holders because an unsuccessful
licensee, one that
did not prevail on its invalidity charge, would lose its license to
12
use the patent.
However, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Medlmmune profoundly
altered the declaratory judgment landscape.' 3 In Medlmmune, the Supreme Court
held that a patent licensee could seek a declaration on the validity or enforceability
of a patent without breaching the licensing agreement. 4 As a result of the
Medlmmune decision, the declaratory judgment action has now become a
dangerous weapon in a licensee's arsenal. A licensee no longer runs the risk of
losing the license if he fails to invalidate the patent.
The Medlmmune decision, on its face, has left patent holders defenseless.
Licensees can negotiate a patent license and face no risk in challenging the validity
of the patent. However, as this Note indicates, all is not lost for patent holders
in the post-Medlmmune licensing landscape. A careful reading of the Medrmmune
decision reveals implicit support by the Supreme Court for the free negotiation
of patent licensing agreements and the reinstatement of no-challenge clauses in
licensing agreements.
This Note argues that because no-challenge clauses benefit the agreeing parties
and the public at large, and because the Medlmmune decision implicitly supports
such provisions, no-challenge clauses may be used again in patent licensing
negotiation. Part II of this Note discusses the Lear decision and the history of
no-challenge clauses. Parts III and IV review the Declaratory Judgment Act and
how it has been altered by Medlmmune. Part V examines notable decisions after
Medlmmune and how the declaratory judgment standard has functionally changed.
Finally, Parts VI and VII discuss the policy and Medlmmune support of the
reimplementation of no-challenge clauses.
II. THE HISTORY OF NO-CHALLENGE CLAUSES IN PATENT
LICENSING SITUATIONS

Before the Supreme Court's decision in Lear,Inc. v. Adkins,' 5 patent holders
and licensees clashing over patent validity struggled to find consistency in the

" See Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376passim (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining that the
court looks to the conduct of the infringer and finding no controversy where there was not a
material breach).
12See id.
13Medlmmune, 549 U.S. at 118 (2007).
14 Id at 135-36.
15 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
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courts. 16 Thus, licensing contracts addressed the effect of patent validity
challenges on the contractual relationship. 17 The courts' decisions provided
responses regarding issues the license failed to address.' 8 One such response,
called the licensee estoppel rule, provides that if a licensee is operating under a
license agreement, the licensee is estopped from contesting whether the patent is
valid.' 9
The licensee estoppel rule is founded on the idea that a licensee should not be
able to enjoy the benefits derived from use of the patent under the licensing
agreement and simultaneously challenge the validity of the patent on which the
agreement is based."0 This rule creates a de facto no-challenge termination clause
where the licensee cannot challenge the patent's validity."'
The United States Supreme Court, however, believed that the licensee estoppel
rule was flawed for a number of reasons and ultimately struck down the rule. The
Supreme Court in Lear vacated a decision of the California Supreme Court that
had used the licensee estoppel doctrine to prevent the Lear Airplane Company,
the patent licensee, from defending a contract action for royalties. 22 The
California Supreme Court held that under the doctrine of licensee estoppel, Lear
was not allowed to challenge the validity of Adkins' patent if Lear did not
terminate the agreement.23 The California court found that Lear had not
terminated the agreement properly.24 The United States Supreme Court reversed
the California Supreme Court's decision, stating that the doctrine of licensee
estoppel was "so eroded that it could no longer be considered the 'general
rule.' ,21 In Lear,the Court noted that the rule of licensee estoppel fails to address
the "public interest in permitting full and free competition in the use of ideas
which are in reality a part of the public domain. ' 26 The Lear court further

16 Seegeneral/JohnW. Schlicher, Patent IUcensin& What to do After Medlmmune v. Genentech, 89

J. PAT. &TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 364,369 (2007) (stating that for years patent owners and licensees
had to contend with the reality that a patent's validity was never certain).
17 See id. (discussing the use of a variety of license terms to describe the effect of a patent's
validity on royalty payments).
18 Id.

19 Sarah M. King, Clearing the Patent Thicket: The Supreme Court and Congress Undertake Patent
Reform, 19 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 13,15 (2007).
20 Id.

21 See Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltime Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 836 (1950)

(discussing the general rule that a "licensee under a patent license agreement may not challenge the
validity of [a] licensed patent in a suit for royalties due under [a] contract').
2 Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 676 (1969).
Adkins v. Lear, Inc., 435 P.2d 321, 331 (1967), vacated, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
24 Id at 325.
2I-ear,
395 U.S. at 664.
20 Id at 670.
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explained that "[l]icensees may often be the only individuals with enough
economic incentive to challenge the patentability of an inventor's discovery[, and]
[i]f they are muzzled, the public may continually be required to pay tribute to
would-be monopolists without need or justification."27
After Lear, lower courts have struck down no-challenge clauses without
exception." For example, in Plastic Contact Lens Co. v. WKS. Contact Lens
Laboratories,Inc., the court stated that the defendants violated the no-contest
clause of their license agreements, but such a clause did not restrict the defendants
from challenging the patent's validity.29 In Bendix Cotp. v. Bala, Inc., where the
licensor brought an infringement suit against the licensee to prove the patent
valid, the Seventh Circuit commented on the no-challenge clause issue. 30 The
court stated that the Lear decision invalidated licensors' long-held right to prevent
licensees from challenging a patent, concluding that such a right is outside the
protection afforded by the patent monopoly.3 Subsequent cases established the
Supreme Court's view that the patent laws are concerned with keeping the granted
patent monopoly within its allowed scope.32 The Court held that no-challenge
clauses unduly extend the monopolistic powers granted to the patent owner.33
Finally, courts have held that licensees are not estopped from challenging the
validity of certification marks, despite the presence of an express no-challenge
provision in a license.34 Thus, these above mentioned cases prove the Supreme
Court's decision in Learhas guided courts to strike down no-challenge clauses in
license agreements. Although Lear eliminated a patent holder's ability to ensure
that a prospective licensee would not pursue expensive litigation asserting patent

27 Id.

2' See, e.g., Bendix Corp. v. Balax, Inc., 421 F.2d 809, 821 (7th Cir. 1970); Wallace Clark & Co.
v. Acheson Indus., Inc., 401 F. Supp. 637, 639-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Congoleum Indus., Inc. v.
Armstrong Cork Co., 366 F. Supp. 220,232-33 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Blohm & Voss AG v. PrudentialGrace Lines, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1116,1141-42 (D. Md. 1972), rev'don othergrounds,489 F.2d 231 (4th
Cir. 1973).
' 330 F. Supp. 441, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (licensee brought action to recoup royalties under
license agreements on grounds that the patent was invalid).
'0421 F.2d at 821.
31 Id at 820-21. A patent gives one the exclusionary right to keep others from making, using,
offering for sale, selling, and importing the claimed invention. 35 U.S.C. 154(a)(1) (2002).
32 See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343-44 (1971)
(discussing the fear that patentees will attempt to extend their monopolies by attaching conditions
to the use of a license).
33 Id.
34 See Idaho Potato Comm'n v. M & M Produce Farm & Sales, 335 F.3d 130, 138-39 (2d
Cir. 2003) (holding that the public interest in preserving a market for the product outweighed the
owner's enforcement interest).
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invalidity, the Declaratory Judgment Act was available to provide protection to
patent holders.

III. GENERAL STANDARDS FOR STATING A CLAIM FOR A
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

The Declaratory Judgment Act supports federal court jurisdiction only in the
event of an "actual controversy." 35 This requirement authorizes the federal
judiciary to hear only justiciable cases and controversies.36
The Supreme Court has long recognized that "[t]he difference between an
abstract question and a 'controversy' contemplated by the Declaratory Judgment
Act is necessarily one of degree, and it would be difficult," if not impossible, to
create and apply an effective test for determining whether there is such a
controversy.37 The Court consistently requires that the dispute be "definite and
concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests" and
"a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree
of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law
would be upon a hypothetical state of facts."38 Therefore, under the Declaratory
Judgment Act, an alleged infringer could sue a patent owner for a declaratory
judgment over a dispute of patent invalidity or noninfringement.39
Prior to the Medlmmune decision, an action seeking a declaratory judgment that
a patent was not infringed or was unenforceable could be brought by any party,
but only if both inquiries of the Federal Circuit's two-part test to determine
whether a controversy existed were satisfied.' According to the Federal Circuit,
in order for a district court to have jurisdiction to hear a declaratory judgment
action in patent cases,
There must be both (1) an explicit threat or other action by the
patentee, which creates a reasonable apprehension on the part of
the declaratory judgment plaintiff that it will face an infringement

35 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (a) (2006).
36 U.S. CONST. art. III.

" Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941).
Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937).
3" MultiMedia Patent Trust v. Microsoft Corp., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1218 (S.D. Ca. 2007)
(referencing 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006)).
o Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376,1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (stating that the "court
has developed a pragmatic inquiry that focuses on not only the conduct of the patentee but also the
conduct of the putative infringer").
3'
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suit, and (2) present activity which could constitute infringement or
41
concrete steps taken with the intent to conduct such activity.

However, even if the conditions for declaratory judgment were met, the court still
had "unique and substantial discretion" in deciding whether to hear a declaratory
judgment action.42
The first part of the Federal Circuit's inquiry became known as the
"reasonable apprehension of imminent suit" test.43 According to the court, a
plaintiff had to feel more than just nervousness to have a reasonable
apprehension of suit for this prong to have been met.' This apprehension must
have arisen from objective circumstances.4" Thus, the reasonable apprehension
of imminent suit test needed to be satisfied for a court to have jurisdiction over
a declaratory judgment claim. In a patent licensing context, the Federal Circuit
had determined that a case or controversy could only be established if the licensee
first breached the agreement.' Thus, a licensee had to breach the agreement to
assert invalidity, leaving the licensee with no license should he fail to prove the
patent invalid.
The second part of the inquiry, which is beyond the scope of this Note,
ensures that there exists a controversy by requiring infringement or intent to
infringe by a person if the patent is valid.47
IV. THE MEDIMMUAIE V. GENENTECH DECISION
Medlmmune eliminated the Federal Circuit's reasonable apprehension of
imminent suit requirement for jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action. 4 The
new standard for determining whether such a declaratory judgment action may be
maintained is established in Medlmmune and the Supreme Court precedent cited
in footnote eleven of Medlmmune.49 Under Medlmmune, for a court to properly
hear a declaratory action, the court must determine" 'the facts alleged, under all
the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties

41 Id. (quoting BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).

42 Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995).
41 Phillips Plastics Corp. v. Kato Hatsujou Kabushiki Kaisha, 57 F.3d 1051, 1053-54 (Fed.
Cir. 41995).
4

id.

45 Id.

' Gen-Probe, 359 F.3d passim.
4' BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975,978 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The second inquiry

is outside of the scope of this Note because MedAmmune addresses only the first prong of the inquiry.
4' MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
41 Id. at 126-34 n.11.
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having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the
issuance of a declaratory judgment.' "50 Footnote eleven of MedImmune took
exception to the Federal Circuit's declaratory judgment test. The Supreme Court
stated:
[The Supreme Court's decision in Altvater v. Freeman] contradict[s]
the Federal Circuit's "reasonable apprehension of suit" test (or, in
its evolved form, the "reasonable apprehension of imminent suit"
test). A licensee who pays royalties under compulsion of an
injunction has no more apprehension of imminent harm than a
licensee who pays royalties for fear of treble damages and an
injunction fatal to his business. The reasonable-apprehension-ofsuit test also conflicts with our decisions in MarylandCasualy Co. v.
Pacific Coal & Oil Co., where jurisdiction obtained even though the
collision-victim defendant could not have sued the declaratoryjudgment plaintiff-insurer without first obtaining a judgment against
the insured; and Aetna life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, where
jurisdiction obtained even though the very reason the insurer
sought declaratory relief was that the insured had given no
indication that he would file suit. It is also in tension with Cardinal
Chemical Co. v. Morton International,Inc., which held that appellate
affirmance of a judgment of noninfringement, eliminating any
apprehension of suit, does not moot a declaratory judgment
counterclaim of patent invalidity."'
Through Medlmmune and the Supreme Court precedent cited in Medlmmune's
footnote eleven, the reasonable apprehension of imminent suit test has been
eliminated as a required element in determining whether a party can maintain a
declaratory judgment action. 2
For a party to bring a declaratory judgment action under the Medlmmune
standard, the controversy must be " 'definite and concrete, touching the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests'; and that it be 'real and
substantial' and 'admi[t] of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive
character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon

'o Id. at 127 n.ll (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)).
51Id at 134 n.11 (citations omitted).

'2 See SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("The
Supreme Court's opinion inMedlmmune represents a rejection of our reasonable apprehension of suit
test."); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1338 (Fed. Cit. 2007)
("[F]ollowing Medlmmune, we recognize that we are not relying on our two-part reasonableapprehension-of-suit test.').
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a hypothetical state of facts.' ,,"3 The four cases cited in footnote eleven of
Medlmmune discuss the application of such an inquiry.
A. SUPREME COURT CASES CITED IN FOOTNOTE ELEVEN OF MEDIMMUNE

In Aetna Lfe Insurance Co. v. Haworth, Aetna issued multiple insurance policies
with different terms and benefits to Haworth.' During the term of the policies,
the policyholder ceased paying premiums on four of the policies while claiming
the disability benefits stipulated in the policies."5 A dispute ultimately arose as to
whether the policies had lapsed. 6 According to the Court, if the policies were still
in good standing, the policyholder or, upon his death, his beneficiary, was entitled
to collect a sum of money under the policies.5" The insurance company brought
a declaratory judgment action to have the Court determine the true nature of the
policyholder's disability.5 8 The policyholder had yet to commence any type of
action that would have allowed the insurance company an opportunity to prove
the non-existence of the alleged disability. 9 The insurance company argued that
if no immediate action was taken, certain evidence may be lost and the insurance
company would have to maintain a sum of money in reserve for possible future
60
payment under the policy.
The Court held that the DeclaratoryJudgment Act is procedural only, and that
"cases of actual controversy" comports with the Constitutional provision limiting
judicial power to cases or controversies. 6' The Court reasoned that a controversy
must be "one that is appropriate for judicial determination" where "[a] justiciable
controversy is thus distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical
or abstract character; from one that is academic or moot."6 The Court further
stated that the controversy must be real, substantial, concrete, and able to be
63
relieved by a conclusive decree as opposed to an advisory opinion.
In Aetna, the Court found the dispute in question, which related to legal rights
and obligations arising from the insurance contracts and the dispute, was definite

51MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41

(1937)).
54 Aetna, 300 U.S. at 237.
55Id.
s6 Id. at 238.
" Id. at 238-39.
s8 Id. at 239.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61

Id. at 239-40.

62 Id. at 240.
63

Id. at 241.
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and concrete and not hypothetical or abstract. 6 The Court further noted that
before the suit, the parties had taken opposing positions with respect to their
obligations. 65 On one hand, the policyholder claimed he was permanently
66
disabled and therefore relieved of his obligation to make premium payments.
The policyholder also presented his claim formally to the insurance company as
required by the policies.67 On the other hand, the insurance company claimed
that the policyholder's alleged permanent disability did not exist, and since
premium payments continued to be due, the policy had lapsed. 61 Ultimately, the
Court viewed the dispute as a case or controversy, and thus conferred the
authority to decide the dispute to the district court under the Declaratory
Judgment Act. 69 No reasonable apprehension of suit was present in this
case-simply a dispute and the potential for a suit existed.
The second case cited in footnote eleven, MarylandCasualy Co. v. Pacific Coal
& Oil Co., involved an insurance company-policyholder relationship.7 ° A vehicle
owned by the policyholder was involved in an accident; subsequently, the third
party involved in the accident brought suit against the policyholder.7 The
insurance company disputed whether the vehicle and the employee driver were
covered under the policy since the vehicle had been sold to the employee driver
by the insured.72 The insurance company brought a declaratory judgment action
to determine its liability under the policy due to actions of the policyholder.73
The question before the Court in Maryland Casualoy Co. was whether the
insurance company's allegations qualified under the DeclaratoryJudgment Act as
an actual controversy.74 The Court explained that "[t]he difference between an
abstract question and a 'controversy' contemplated by the Declaratory Judgment
Act is necessarily one of degree, and it would be difficult, if it would be possible,
to fashion a precise test for determining in every case whether there is such a
controversy."75 The Court further determined that the question in each case is
whether the facts show that there is a substantial and imminent controversy
between adverse parties which warrants the issuance of a declaratory judgment.76

64 Id. at 242.
65

Id.

66

Id.

67

Id

68

Id.

69 Id. at 244.
70 312 U.S. 270 (1941).
71 Id. at 271.

Id. at 271-72.
73 Id at 272.
72

74 Id.
75 Id. at
76

id.

273.
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The conflict in the third case, Altvater v. Freeman, arose when two parties
entered into a license agreement that specified territories in which sales of the
patented article were permitted.77 The licensor filed suit for specific performance
of the agreement, an injunction to stop article sales, and an accounting.78 In
response, the licensee counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment finding that the
reissue patent was invalid and argued that their royalty payments made under the
agreement were done so under protest.79 The licensee alleged that an adjudication
of the controversy and dispute between the parties was required in order to
protect the business developed properly under the license.'
Therefore the controversy in Altvater concerned the validity of the reissue
patents. Royalties were being paid under protest and under the compulsion of an
injunction decree.8 The Court stated that "[u]nless the injunction decree were
modified, the only other course was to defy it, and to risk not only actual but
treble damages in infringement suits."82 The Court concluded "it was the
function of the Declaratory Judgment Act to afford relief against such peril and
insecurity."83 The district court found that a license agreement did not exist with
respect to the reissued patents, the accused devices did not infringe the licensor's
reissued patents, and the reissued patents were invalid.' On a petition for
rehearing and motion to modify the opinion and revise the decree, the appealate
court held that when the district court found no license agreement and no
infringement, "the other issues became moot and there was no longer a justiciable
controversy between the parties." 8
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case because it felt the court of
appeals had misinterpreted a prior Supreme Court decision.86 The misinterpreted
decision, ElectricalFitingsCorp. v. Thomas &Betts Co., concerned a claim for patent
infringement with an answer of noninfringement.87 The alleged infringer in
ElectricalFitings,however, never asserted a counterclaim of invalidity.88 After the
dismissal of the complaint for failure to prove infringement, the district court
found that the patent in dispute was valid. 9 The Supreme Court held the finding

- 319 U.S. 359 (1943).
'8 Id.
at 360.
79 Id.

80 Id.at 361.
8' Id.at 365.
83

Id
Id.

84

Id at 362.

82

85 Id.

Id at 363.
307 U.S. 241 (1939).
Id.at 242.
89 Id
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of validity was immaterial to the disposition of the original claim for
infringement.9" However, the Supreme Court foundAltvaterto be distinguishable
from ElectricalFittingsbecause in Altvater a counterclaim of patent invalidity was
before the Court, not just a bill and answer.9 The Supreme Court acknowledged
inAltvaterthat a "controversy was raging, even apart from the continued existence
of the license agreement."92 Furthermore, the controversy was sufficiently
definite and concrete for declaratory judgment despite no reasonable
apprehension of imminent suit.93
In the final case cited in footnote eleven, Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton
Internaional,Inc., the Supreme Court reviewed the Federal Circuit's practice of
vacating declaratory judgment holdings regarding validity which were issued in the
same case with a finding of noninfringement. 94 The Court ruled that a finding
that a patent has not been infringed was not a sufficient reason for vacating a
declaratory judgment holding the patent invalid.9" The Court recognized that
"[elven if it may be good practice to decide no more than is necessary to
determine an appeal, it is clear that the Federal Circuit had jurisdiction to review
the declaratory judgment of invalidity."96
The Supreme Court noted that while Federal Circuit practice of vacating
declaratory actions of patent invalidity when the court found no infringement was
consistent with Supreme Court precedent, it was not required.97 The Court stated
that this practice is "neither compelled by our cases nor supported by the 'case or
controversy' requirement of Article I11."98
B. NOTABLE DECISIONS AFTER MEDIMMUNE

More recently, the Federal Circuit has put a bit of texture into the Medlmmune
decision. The Federal Circuit decided SanDisk Corp. v.STMicroelectronics,Inc.99 and
Teva PharmaceuticalsUSA, Inc. v. NovartisPharmaceuticalsCorp." within four days of
each other. Both holdings established that the reasonable apprehension of

9 Id.

91Altvater, 319 U.S. at 363 ("Though the decision of non-infringement disposes of the bill and
answer, it does not dispose of the counterclaim which raises the question of validity.").
92 Id. at 364.
93 Id.

- 508 U.S. 83 (1993).
9' Id at 98.

96Id.
9' Id. at 95.
98

Id. at 99.

9 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
100 482 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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imminent suit test was no longer applicable.'' In SanDisk, the Federal Circuit
established a new test for the existence of declaratory judgment jurisdiction based
on preliminary exchanges following the Medlmmune decision.'0 2 The test reads:
[W]here a patentee asserts rights under a patent based on certain
identified ongoing or planned activity of another party, and where
that party contends that it has the right to engage in the accused
activity without license, an Article III case or controversy will arise
and the party need not risk a suit for infringement by engaging in
the identified activity before seeking a declaration of its legal
10 3
rights.
The new test looks for an assertion of patent rights based on an identified activity
and a contention of the right to engage in the activity without a license. In the
SanDisk case, the court held there was a controversy under the new test despite
the patentee's testimony recalling past statements indicating he would not sue the
plaintiff." a While the court limited its review to the facts and circumstance of the
case, the concurring opinion declared that "[i]n practical application, the new test
will not be confined to cases with facts similar to this one."' 0' The concurrence
continues:
[I]he rule adopted by the court in this case will effect a sweeping
change in our law regarding declaratory judgment jurisdiction.
Despite the references in the court's opinion to the particular facts
of this case, I see no practical stopping point short of allowing
declaratory judgment actions in virtually any case in which the
recipient of an invitation to take a patent license elects to dispute
10 6
the need for a license and then to sue the patentee.
Teva Pharmaceuicals, a declaratory judgment action brought by an alleged
infringer, involved four of five patents listed by the defendant in the FDA's
Orange Book for its approved pioneer drug. 07 In response to the plaintiff's filing
for approval of a generic version of the drug, the defendant filed an infringement

101

SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1380; Teva Pharm., 482 F.3d at 1338-39.

102

SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1381.

103

Id.

04

Id.at 1382-83.

10'

Id. at 1384 (Bryson, J.,
concurring).

'06

Id.at 1385.

107Teva Pbarm., 482 F.3d at 1334-35.
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suit on only one of the five listed patents.' ° Applying the new test developed
after MedImmune, the Court used broad language and rationale to undercut the
plaintiffs isolating strategy. 9 The court stated: "MedImmune teaches that in a
declaratory judgment action, 'all the circumstances' must demonstrate that a
justiciable Article III 'controversy' exists. A justiciable Article III controversy
requires the party instituting the action to have standing and the issue presented
to the court to be ripe."" 0 However, "conduct on its own may not be sufficient to
establish an Article III controversy.""'
Other holdings have also brought clarity to the MedImmune decision. In Cellco
Partnershipv. Broadcom Coip., the Federal Circuit cited MedImmune's reminder that
courts have the power to dismiss declaratory judgment actions on discretionary
grounds." 2 The opinion stated that "MedImmune [] reaffirmed that trial courts
have 'unique and substantial discretion' in determining whether to decide cases
over which they have declaratory judgment jurisdiction.""' 3 In MedImmune, the
Supreme Court left "the equitable, prudential, and policy arguments in favor of
such a discretionary dismissal for the lower courts' consideration on remand.""' 4
In following Supreme Court precedent, the Federal Circuit in Cellco stated that
potential judicial efficiency was a sufficient reason to support the district court's
dismissal of the declaratory judgment action."'
However, despite the Federal Circuit's attempts to clarify the Supreme Court's
holding, some courts have declined to adopt MedImmune's sweeping change." 6 In
Sensitron,Inc.v. Wallace, the court acknowledged the Federal Circuit's interpretation
of MedImmune had broadened the scope of injuries-in-fact which meet the actual
controversy requirements of the Declaratory Judgment Act." 7 Despite the
Federal Circuit's interpretation, the court construed MedImmune's holding by
declaring:

Id.
109 Id. at 1340.
108

'0Id.
at 1337.
lit

Id. at 1341 (emphasis added).

112 227 F. App'x 889, 889 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (nonprecedential).
113 Id.

114 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 136 (2007).

n Celko, 227 F. App'x at 890.
16 See, e.g.,
Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., No. 1:06CV313, 2007 WL 928669, at *2 (S.D.
Ohio Mar. 27, 2007) (holding that Medlmmune does not apply outside its factual scenario); WS
Packaging Group, Inc. v. Global Commerce Group, LLC, No. 06-C-674, 2007 WL 205559, at *2
n.3 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 24, 2007) (stating that Medlmmune should not be read so broadly as to create a
new jurisdictional test for declaratory judgment actions).
17 504 F. Supp. 2d 1180,1184 (D. Utah 2007).
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[In the context of declaratory judgment actions seeking invalidity
or non-infringement of patents, it appears that neither MedImmune,
nor the cases that follow it, have given any indication that an injuryin-fact may exist absent (a) any activity by the seeking party which
could be identified as potential current or future infringement, or
(b) some form of ongoing injury-such as the compulsory payment
of royalties under a license-which, if removed, could result in
potential current or future infringement." 8
The court further explained that
absent any suggestion of potential infringement, either current or
future, or other identifiable actual or imment injury caused by
Plaintiff (or counterclaim Defendant) there is no injury that can be
redressed by judicial relief and that is of sufficient immediacy and
reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.' 9
V. MEDIMMUNE AND ITS BASIC EFFECT ON THE PATENT
LICENSING LANDSCAPE

Medlmmune's basic legacy has been the liberalization of declaratory judgment
standards. A patent holder has little power to prevent a licensee from bringing
a declaratory judgment action of noninfringement or invalidity. Most likely, it will
take an act of Congress to substantially alter the Supreme Court's new standard
for declaratory judgment actions. However, patent holders can take measures to
protect themselves from the licensees' new rights. An examination of the cases
cited in Medlmmune, which will likely govern declaratory judgment jurisprudence
for many years, reveals some guidelines for future declaratory judgment suits and
adds substance to the standard for declaratory judgment.
In Aetna,120 some communication between the two parties occurred as the
policyholder claimed benefits and the insurance company refused to recognize the
claims. Adverse positions were taken, and a clear dispute relating to legal rights
and obligations under a contract was present.'
The underlying disputed facts
were definite and not hypothetical."2 Therefore, in applying Aetna to a general
declaratory judgment situation, where an agreement is in place and a

119

Id. at 1184.
Id. at 1185.

'

Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937).

1'

121 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
122 See spra note 64 and accompanying text.
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communicated dispute arises regarding the existing and definable legal obligations
under the agreement, the Medlmmune declaratory judgment standard is likely met.
In Mayland Casualty, it was not apparent whether formal communication
occurred between the insurance company and the policyholder or the third party
involved in the accident. However, a complaint was filed by the insurance
company in federal court'23 alleging the company had no liability to defend the
action or indemnify the policyholder because the vehicle involved was not hired
by the insured.' In applying Mayland Casualty to general declaratory judgment
situations, an underlying dispute of obligations under an agreement is also
sufficient to satisfy Article III controversy requirements.
In Altvater, the Supreme Court found a controversy can be "raging,"
notwithstanding the existence of the license agreement."' Royalties were being
demanded and paid under protest and under the compulsion of an injunction
decree.'26 Altvaterheld that a licensee's failure to cease its payment of royalties did
not render non-justiciable a dispute over the validity of the patent. In applying
Altvater to general declaratory judgment situations, a dispute under some
agreement or injunction that results in a legal obligation likely must be present in
order for the court to have jurisdiction in an action for declaratory judgment. In
Alvater, the controversy involved an injunction decree. In MedImmune, the
controversy was a license agreement. These agreements create a relationship that
establishes legal obligations where a dispute arising under them may satisfy Article
III requirements. Altvater noted that "[t]he fact that royalties were being paid did
not make this a 'difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character.127
These cases also demonstrate that Article III requirements are likely met in
disputes concerning the legal obligations under an agreement or contract.
Where an agreement or prior relationship is in place that creates legal
obligations regarding patents that are disputed, jurisdiction is likely present. For
future declaratory judgment parties, it would likely be sufficient that some form
of a dispute or disagreement be communicated between the parties. As
established by the cases discussed above, this communication does not have to
arise under threats of imminent suit.
Cases decided after Medlmmune further clarify its holding. In SanDisk,2 8 the
lesson for patentees is clear. In SanDisk, the court declined to hold that the
defendant's statement not to sue SanDisk eliminated the justiciable controversy

123
124

The personal injury action was in state court.
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.

i See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
126 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
1 Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359,364 (1943) (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn.

v.Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937)).
125

SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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created by his actions because his conduct indicated a willingness to enforce his
patent rights despite the statement. 129 Thus, isolated statements expressing a lack
of plans to sue will not neutralize a course of conduct that shows a preparedness
and willingness to enforce patent rights. The SanDisk court suggested patentees
may avoid the risk of declaratory judgments by conducting licensing negotiations
under confidentiality agreements. 3 °
These cases establish that the courts have power to hear declaratory judgment
actions in almost any scenario. With these holdings as guidelines, a licensee can
be assured that it will meet the standards for a court to determine patent validity.
The patent holder is left in a difficult situation that will undoubtedly influence his
decisions to license his patent. As this Note will show, the influence of the courts
in patent licensing has an adverse effect that resonates far beyond the licensing
parties.
VI. FEDERAL PATENT POLICY SUPPORTS THE REINSTITUTION OF
NO-CHALLENGE PROVISIONS IN PATENT LICENSING AGREEMENTS

The patent system has been established to stimulate invention, a goal which
has been long recognized in the Constitution'31 and federal statutes.132 The patent
system rewards ingenious inventors whose contributions further new ideas and
technology, encouraging innovation in all areas of technology. An immovable set
of laws on which the inventor can rely is essential for continuing success in
developing technology. The erosion of patent holders' rights in contract
negotiation set forth in Lear and MedImmune prevents freedom of contract,
undermines the goals of the patent system, and discourages the use of the patent
laws to protect inventions. Conversely, reinstating the use of no-challenge clauses
in licensing agreements is consistent with the purposes of the patent system.

129 See supranote 104 and accompanying text.
130

SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1375 n.1 ("To avoid the risk of declaratory judgment action, [the

defendant] could have sought SanDisk's agreement to the terms of a suitable confidentiality
agreement.").
131 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (Congress shall have the power "to promote the progress of
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries').
132 The first patent act was enacted in 1790, during the second session of the first Congress.
Patent Act, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) ("Act to promote the progress of useful Arts.').
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A. LEAR ERODES PATENT HOLDERS' RIGHTS, WHICH DISCOURAGES FREELYNEGOTIATED PATENT LICENSES

It has generally been established that certainty in patent agreements, where
each negotiated provision is enforced, is achievable by negotiations between
private parties.' 33 The Supreme Court's decision in Learprevents such a certainty,
for it preempts state contract law by allowing licensees to terminate the contract
and contest validity of the licensed patents despite provisions that do not allow
such conduct. The Court in Lear based its decision on a "strong federal policy
34
favoring free competition in ideas which do not merit patent protection."'
Thus, the Lear Court held that federal patent law trumps the common law of
contracts because the public interest in permitting full and free competition
outweighed the terms of the contract negotiated by the parties. 3 The policy
rational, in Lear-that the removal of a restraint on commerce caused by the use
of an invalid patent is more important than enforcing136a contract between
compromising parties-has been cast into serious doubt.
Lear does not recognize private patent licensing agreements between
negotiating parties, allowing the licensee to challenge a patent's validity even if the
agreement says otherwise. The rule is economically inefficient, decreases the
output of licensees and increases the deadweight loss of monopoly. The rule's
economic benefits are outweighed by the increased costs associated with increased
litigation, decreased licensee productivity, decreased rate of inventing, and
inefficient exploitation of inventions.13 v It must be noted that one major goal of
patent policy is to ensure that inventors can effectively exploit valid patents and
therefore reap the rewards of their innovations. 38 This fundamental incentive to
invent is seriously skewed if licenses are under constant siege with no assurance

133See

general4 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, DethroningLear: Licensee, Estoppel and the Incentive to
Innovate, 72 VA. L. REV. 677, 758 (1986) ("[P]atenees' protection against patent challenges should
come from their own ability to negotiate.").
134 Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 656 (1969).
131
Id. at 670-71.
136See Lemelson v. Synergistics Research Corp., 669 F. Supp. 642, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding
that "the doctrine of estoppel must give way to the federal policy of unencumbered challenges to
patents believed to be invalid").
137John W. Schlicher, Judidal Regulation of PatentLicensing, Litigation and Settlement underJudal
Pocdes CreatedinLear v. Adkins, 3 AIPLA SELEcTED LEGAL PAPERS, No. 1 (1985) (imposing its own
policy judgment in place of those of the parties, Lear "dramatically limit[s] the value of a patent,
interfere[s] with efficient utilization of inventions and lead[s] to major resource allocation losses').
135 Neil M. Goodman, Note, Patent Licensee Standing and the DeclaratoyJudgmentAct,83 COLUM.
L. REv. 186,207 (1983) (stating that the patent system provides a reward to inventors thus bolstering
research in areas of new ideas and technology).
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of finality. The two prominent problems with Lear,as noted by a legal scholar,
are:
First, the research community as a whole was forced to bear a new
risk. Faced with the difficulty of determining ex ante whether an
invention would be innovative enough to merit a patent, yet
apparently stripped of the option of state law protection, inventors
were forced to discount the expected return from their discoveries
by the probability that a patent would (rightly or wrongly) fail to
issue or subsequently be invalidated, causing the invention to fall
into the public domain before the costs of developing it could be
recouped. Second, [it] directly discouraged research into obviously
unpatentable inventions. Unless inventors could guard and exploit
these discoveries in absolute secrecy, they could never count on a
period of exclusivity in which to capture any of the social benefits
139
their inventions conferred.
Essentially, Lear brought uncertainty and new risks adverse to the patent laws'
goal of innovation. In later cases, the United States Supreme Court attempted to
establish what the goals are and develop a new test to determine whether an
agreement contravenes patent goals.
B. LEAR'S INVALIDATION OF NO-CHALLENGE AGREEMENTS OPPOSES THE
GOALS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM

The goals of the patent system were set forth by the Court in Kewanee Oil Co.
v. Bicron Corp."4 The first goal was to encourage invention."' The second goal,
"was based on the idea that there will be much more innovation if discoveries are
disclosed and patented than there will be when everyone works in secret [thus
fostering] a free exchange of technological information at the cost of a limited 17-

139 Dreyfuss,

supra note 133, at 689.

416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974) (noting two primary objectives of patent law. "encouraging
invention" and "disclosure, the quid pro quo of the right to exclude").
'4

141 Id.
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43
year monopoly."' 42 These goals resonated in Aronson v. 9uick Point Pencil Co.'
Lear's holding neither encourages invention nor fosters disclosure.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the policy of stimulating invention
that underlies the patent system "runs no less deep" than the policy of free
competition.'" Many judges have acknowledged that the actual market is superior
to judicial mimicry of the market.'45 Rules permitting flexibility in negotiation will
result in a greater degree of licensing activity because negotiating parties will not
be constrained by restrictions. When allowed to freely negotiate, parties will set
the terms of the contract to reflect their perception of the strength of the patent,
the likelihood of successful suit brought by the patent holder, the potential use
and value of invention, and other business factors not mentioned. Issues of
patent validity, of which Learwas concerned in protecting the public's rights, can
be reflected through negotiations in contracting for the license."4 Thus,
"[p]ermitting inventors to make enforceable agreements licensing the use of their
47
inventions in return for royalties provides an additional incentive to invention."'
In sum, Lear's elimination of the use of no-challenge clauses does more harm
than good. The patent system is possibly injured when licensees are allowed to
bring offensive patent validity challenges. 48 Such injury to the patent system
harms the policy of promoting invention and reduces both competition and
technological advancement. 149 Unrestricted licensee suits would burden patentees
50
who would have to spend countless resources protecting their property rights.'
This would certainly result in higher costs as patentees increase their fees to cover
anticipated litigation expenses.' 5' These costs will undoubtedly 52be passed along
to the public, offsetting public benefit from the patent system.

concurring); see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376
142Id.
at 496-97 (Douglas, J.,
U.S. 225,230-31 (1964) ("[T]he patent system is one in which uniform federal standards are carefully
used to promote invention while at the same time preserving free competition.").
143440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (explaining that the purposes of the federal patent system are to
foster and reward invention, promote disclosure of inventions in order to stimulate further
invention, and to assure that ideas in the public domain are freely used by the public).
144 Dawson Chem. Co.v.Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 221 (1980).
141In re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litigation, 831 F.
Supp. 1354, 1397 (N.D. IlL.
1993) ('The actual market beats judicial attempts to mimic the market
every time.").
14 For example, a license agreement can have a set royalty payment, wherein the royalty rate falls
to zero dollars if the patent is held invalid.
14' Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262.
Goodman, supra note 138, at 206.
149 Id.

'50Id.at 211.
151 Id

152 Id
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C. THE EROSION OF PATENT HOLDERS' RIGHTS HAS DISCOURAGED THE USE OF
THE PATENT LAWS TO PROTECT INVENTIONS

In order to determine whether no-challenge clauses increase disclosure of the
invention, one must look at the alternative scenario-the current patent landscape
under the law established in Lear and Medlmmune. As stated earlier, a policy
denying private parties the ability to negotiate no-challenge clauses in licensing
agreements discourages people from applying for patents and makes them
reluctant to disclose their inventions." 3 Inventors have begun to look to other
areas of the law to
protect their rights to their inventions.'54 One such area of law
55
is trade secrets.
Under the law of trade secrets, the inventor protects his invention by keeping
5 6
his discovery secret, ensuring that the invention is never revealed to the public.'
The inventor may, however, license the use of the invention to another, so long
as the licensee promises to keep the information secret. 57 In this way, the
58
inventor may preserve his invention while being rewarded for his discovery.'
Because the doctrine of trade secrets has not been preempted by federal law, it
has become a viable alternative for inventors to protect their patents, without the
burden of disclosure or public dedication.5 9 Furthermore, unlike the law of
patents, trade secrets have no term limits, so the inventor can withhold the
technology from the public as long as desired. 6 °
The Supreme Court's rejection of no-challenge clauses, eliminating free
negotiation of licensing contracts, has made trade secret protection an enticing
avenue by which an inventor can protect his invention. However, this turn
toward trade secret protection is, in many ways, not in the public's best interest.
Trade secret protection in lieu of patent protection severely limits disclosure and
licensing of inventions.'6' Those few who do obtain a license will be bound to
secrecy. 62 Patentable ideas marketed as trade secrets are not adequately disclosed,
therefore the public cannot improve upon them. 63 This certainly does not
achieve one of the enumerated goals of the patent system.

153See supra Part VI.A.
154Goodman, spra note 138, at 212.
155 Id.
156 id
157 id

158 Id
159 id
'60 Id at 213.
161 id
162 Id.
163 id
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Even as inventors turn to trade secret law for stronger protection, they
nevertheless suffer. Trade secret protection exacts hidden costs. 164 Primarily, an
inventor may withhold licensing to a party whom he feels may disclose the
invention, despite the existence of the trade secret. 16 Thus the inventor will
66
license less, rendering his return on investment smaller.
With the rejection of no-challenge clauses by the courts, inventors have turned
to trade secret protection. However, trade secret protection undermines the
patent system's goal that the public should benefit from inventions. For instance,
trade secret protection has no term limit, so the public cannot take advantage of
a trade secret-protected invention unless the secret is revealed at the inventor's
discretion. On the other hand, the patent system protects inventions which
ensure that inventions will remain in the public use. Furthermore, the public
gains free use of patented inventions in twenty years when the patent expires.
Upholding licensing agreements with a no-challenge clause makes it more likely
that the patent system will be used, meaning
"ideas in the public domain remain
67
there for the free use of the public."'
In sum, no-challenge termination clauses are favorable to the public as
opposed to trade secret laws because the clauses empower the licensor through
patent law, which requires disclosure and assures that inventions remain in the
public domain.
D. THE REINSTITUTION OF NO-CHALLENGE PROVISIONS IS SUPPORTED BY
PUBLIC POLICY

The licensee, the patent holder, and the public at large benefit from the use of
no-challenge provisions in patent licensing. No-challenge provisions are aligned
with federalism and the encouragement of competition and economic growth.
Thus, no-challenge provisions should be reinstituted.
No-challenge agreements should be governed by state contract law rather than
federal judge-made law. Courts must decide whether patent protection is
preempted by operation of the federal patent law.16 In preemption situations,
Congress, and not the courts, is in the best position to assess how to encourage
challenges to a patent's validity and who should raise them. It has been held that

164 id
165 Id.
'

Id[

167

See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257,262 (1979) (discussing several purposes

behind the patent system).
" Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,479 (1974) ("The only limitation on the States
is that in regulating the area of patents and copyrights they do not conflict with the operation of the
laws in this area passed by Congress.").

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol16/iss1/7

22

Goldstucker: Stop the Bleeding: Medimmune Ends the Unjustified Erosion of Pate

20081

STOP THE BLEEDING

federal courts should avoid interfering with patent licensing agreements that are
reasonable and completely agreed upon because licensees are likely to know best
the risks and law involved in making such contracts.169
As a matter of policy, no-challenge clauses foster competition and economic
growth and efficiency by making technology and intellectual property more widely
available. ° Widely available information spurs innovation. Thus, the more a
patent is licensed, the more likely it will be used, and the more likely it will incite
even further innovation. A patent will be licensed more frequently if parties are
allowed to freely contract under patent law. More frequent licensing increases the
dissemination of information on a particular patent, a result in line with patent
policy.
In today's global economy, the United States must innovate more and
efficiently produce inventions. No-challenge clauses foster this goal by
encouraging the inventor to create and license the invention.
VII. IN THE CONTEXT OF MEDIMMUNE'S EFFECT ON DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT ACTIONS, NO-CHALLENGE PROVISIONS MUST BE ALLOWED

The restrictive holdings of LearandMedlmmune abolished three crucial features
of the decision
to license and the royalty amount charged between contracting
1
17

parties.

First, in a licensing landscape without LearandMed'Immune, a patent owner and
potential licensee would agree to a payment reflecting their estimation of the cost
of an infringement litigation alternative. 172 The licensor and licensee would be
willing to license for payments discounted based on the probability that the patent
is valid.'73 Thus, if payment corresponds with the probability of patent validity,
a patent owner will likely license a valid patent only for a higher payment. The

69 See generaly Christian Chadd Taylor, Note, No-Challenge Termination Clauses: Incorporating

Innovation Pok and Risk Allocation into PatentLicensing Law, 69 IND. L.J. 215, 231-32 (1993) (stating
agreements must be considered under state contract law "to preserve the integrity of contents").
170 Goodman, supra note 138, at 206 ("If current licensees are allowed to bring offensive patent
validity challenges, the patent system may be injured. Injury to the patent system may in turn harm
our long-standing policy of promoting inventors, and may ultimately reduce both competition and
technological advance.').
271 See Schlicher, supranote 16, at 373 (license payments that reflect views of litigation alternative,
licensing to avoid litigation costs, and licensing for lower payments because the license involves less
risk of suit).
172 Id
273 Id The parties would agree to higher payments for stronger patents and lower payments for
patents less likely to be valid. Id.
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licensee may be willing to make the higher payment so long as the royalty payment
is less than the expected cost of potential patent validity litigation. 4
Second, without Lear and MedImmune interfering with patent licenses, parties
Thus, licensing
would use licensing agreements to avoid litigation costs.'
without fear of infringement litigation costs allows a patent owner to license for
a lower payment and a current infringer to pay more for a license. This increases
the likelihood of licensing. 6
Third, without these decisions, patent owners could contract out of risk. 1 7 In
turn, they would be willing to license for lower payments, so long as risk of suit
decreases. Therefore, parties must create license agreements that account for the
probability of winning and losing infringement
risk that their predictions of the
78
and invalidity suits are wrong.1
In sum, in a free-licensing landscape, a risk-averse patent owner will license for
a payment that is lower than the expected value of infringement litigation. On the
other hand, a risk-averse infringer will pay more than the expected cost of
litigation because he will avoid filing suit and gain use of the invention. It holds
1 79
true that risk-adverse parties license more often if the license avoids risk.
However, Lear establishes a rule where the licensee bears less risk than he would
in the free-licensing alternative. Further, in the recent MedImmune decision, the
licensee bears zero risk. MedImmune has fundamentally disrupted the established
harmony of risk-averting license agreements.
As shown above, there are numerous policy reasons why no-challenge clauses
should be recognized by courts. Basic constitutional freedoms support the
enforcement of such provisions to license agreements. Furthermore, society is
better off allowing the people negotiating patent licenses to solve problems in a
manner they find mutually advantageous through contract. However, in the postLear landscape, negotiated no-challenge provisions in licensing agreements have
been abandoned, rejected by courts, and ignored by licensors, despite numerous
public policy arguments to the contrary.
There is, however, good news for patent licensors and the public in general.
The good news does not come from Capitol Hill. Congress has not passed
legislation that explicitly allows patent licensors to include no-challenge provisions
in licenses. In fact, in 1986, despite the support of the Department of Justice, a
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Id.

175 Id.

171 Id. If a license "does not avoid validity litigation costs, a patent owner will license only for a
higher payment." However, a licensee likely wil "be willing to pay more, since its infringement
litigation costs are saved." Id
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bill that legalized "no-challenge termination clauses"'8 was terminated in both the
House of Representatives and the Senate.'' This provision, as well as other nochallenge legislation, was part of a much broader bill, and thus its rejection does
not necessarily indicate Congress' intent toward the enforceability of such clauses.
Because of Congressional inaction, the MedImmune decision can become the rallycall to allow the enforcement of no-challenge clauses and overturn Lear.
While Medlmmune did not directly address the enforceability of no-challenge
provisions, the Medlmmune decision provides the licensee with the advantage of
obtaining a license, challenging infringement or the patent's validity, and
maintaining protection under the license.8 2 Current licensors have no choice but
to accept that the Medlmmune decision grants licensees remarkable power.
Potential licensors are left to sift through the new landscape.
However, closer examination of the Supreme Court's language indicates that
the Court may actually enforce no-challenge provisions in patent licensing
agreements. The support of no-challenge provisions can be found in the
Medlmmune Court's support of the freedom to contract.
It is important to note that in Medlmmune the Supreme Court found nothing
in the patent license itself that barred the licensee from challenging the patent's
validity.1 83 The absence of a no-challenge clause in the MedImmune license may
have been because the patent owners assumed that the clause was
unenforceable.'
However, as one scholar notes, "[p]erhaps those assumptions
8
should be reassessed in Medlmmune's wake.' 1
When the action was filed, the license continued to exist and MedImmune
satisfied all of its duties under the license.8 6 At the time of action, Genentech had
no contract claim against MedImmune. Because of this, the district court and

SOA no-challenge termination clause is a provision that authorizes the licensor to terminate a

license if the validity of the patent is challenged by the licensee. Taylor, supra note 169, at n.3.
' Intellectual Property Rights Improvement Act, S. 2525, 99th Cong. (2d Sess. 1986) ("Any
patent license agreement may provide for a party or parties to the agreement to terminate the license
if the licensee asserts in a judicial action the invalidity of the licensed patent, and, if the licensee has
such a right to terminate, the agreement may further provide that the licensee's obligations under
the agreement shall continue until a final and unappealable determination of invalidity is reached or
until [the license is terminated]. Such agreement shall not be unenforceable as to such provisions
on the grounds that such provisions are contrary to the Federal patent law or policy.").
'82 MELVIN F. JAGER, LICENSING LAW HANDBOOK § 5:14: CHALLENGING THE VALIDITY OF
THE LICENSED PATENT (2007).
183 Donald S. Chisum, Licensee Challenges to Patent Vafih&h after MedImmune, 11-12,
Feb. 7,2007,
http://www.chisum.com/MedlmmuneWebPost.pdf.
184 Id.

18sId.
"86MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 122 (2007).
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court of appeals dismissed the action for lack of a justiciable controversy. 8 7 The
Supreme Court, however, held that there was a contract dispute between the
parties about whether the licensee was obligated to make payments if the licensed
patent was invalid.'
If MedImmune's view of the contract was correct, then
MedImmune could prove invalidity to eliminate its royalty obligations in the
agreement. However, the Court did not address whether the law requires that
royalties under all patent licenses depend on validity, or whether a similar dispute
would arise if a license defined royalty obligations without reference to validity.
Nonetheless, the Medlmmune decision will have a drastic effect on the licensing
landscape. Risk-averse licensors will likely read MedAmmune to apply to all patent
licenses. Thus, it is likely that licensees will commence declaratory judgment
actions to have licensed patents declared invalid, arguing that Lear allows all
licensees to defend an action for royalties by proving invalidity, regardless of the
language of the license. In what should make any licensor's hair stand on end,
licensees can now argue that Medlmmune applies no matter how the patent holder
defined the obligation. 9 Licensees will also argue that "[i]f Learmeans the patent
owner and licensee may not agree that royalties are payable until the date of an
invalidity judgment in an action between them, licensees will say they may also not
agree to foreclose litigation that might lead to such a judgment."' 90
However, the Supreme Court in Medlmmune addressed the argument that
touched on such an issue. Genentech argued that the parties in effect settled the
validity dispute when they entered into the license, and that the MedImmune
license precluded the licensee from challenging validity. The Court responded by
stating.
Petitioner is not repudiating or impugning the contract while
continuing to reap its benefits. Rather, it is asserting that the
contract, properly interpreted, does not prevent it from challenging
the patents, and does not require the payment of royalties because
the patents do not cover its products and are invalid. Of course
even if respondents were correct that the licensing agreement or the
common-law rule precludes this suit, the consequence would be
that respondents win this case on the merits - not that the very

187

See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958, 961-65 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd and

remanded, 549 U.S. 118 (2007) (Court of Appeals decision assumed that patent owner had no basis
for terminating the license and could not bring any action against the licensee).
118Medlmmune, 549 U.S. at 124-25.
"9 It can be argued that Learonly eliminated the default rule of licensee estoppel, which simply
forces the parties to address the issue in their license agreements. Under this view, the main decision
in Lear does not preclude parties from contracting out of Medlmmune.
"90Schlicher, supra note 16, at 372.
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genuine contract dispute disappears, so that Article III jurisdiction
is somehow defeated. In short, Article III jurisdiction has nothing
to do with this "insurance-policy" contention. 9'
Thus, the Court stated that the argument did not relate to jurisdiction. If the
license actually precluded the licensee from challenging validity, Genentech would
have won on the merits. This reasoning assumes that an agreement not to contest
validity would be enforceable--and Leardid not require otherwise.
Although Medlmmune did not decide the enforceability of a no-challenge
provision, 92 the Court seemed to assume that an agreement not to contest validity
would be enforceable. If a patent owner includes a no-challenge provision in its
license, it will be met with opposition by the licensee holding the Lear doctrine in
hand. However, agreements not to challenge validity should be enforceable.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The situation for patent licensors is not as grim as it once appeared. After a
steady erosion of patent holders ability to freely license patents, the Court's
decision in MedImmune must be read to stop the trend.
Before Lear,a patent holder could insert a no-challenge clause in the licensing
agreement to ensure that that licensee would not sue over the validity of the
patent. The agreements, negotiated with certainty that each provision would be
enforced, benefited the parties to the contract and the public. License payments
were low, inventors and patent holders were unbothered by the constant threat

of suit, and information gathered from inventions was widely disseminated.
However, Lear invalidated no-challenge clauses in patent licensing agreements,
signaling a new era of court-altered patent contracting. The patent holders'
bargaining power was damaged, and the licensee was empowered to challenge a
patent's validity despite the contract. The licensee still faced the risk that such a
challenge would fail, and because of the Declaratory Judgment Act, he would be
left with nothing. The MedImmune decision sounded a death knell to the licensee's
fears of losing the patent license. After the decision, not only is a patent holder
191 Medlmmune,

549 U.S. at 135-36.

192Schlicher, supranote 16, at 388-89 (distinguishing no-challenge termination clauses, the author

states, "For years, I have recommended that patent owners use a termination provision that permits
the patent owner to terminate the license, if the licensee alleges in any action that the licensed patent
is invalid. This is the simplest and most direct response to Medlmmune, because it puts the situation
back to where it was before Medlmmune. This also helps with Lear. Patent owner termination rights
were not involved in Lear. There is nothing in Lear that says such a termination provision is
unenforceable or contrary to any perceived public policy. There is nothing in MedImmune that would
suggest such a provision is unenforceable.").
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unable prevent a licensee from challenging the validity of his patent, he is forced
to continue to allow the licensee to license the patent subject to the agreement
even if the challenge failed. A narrow interpretation of Medfmmune's holding
disenfranchises patent holders. However, the Supreme Court implicitly supports
no-challenge clauses in its decision.
The Supreme Court recognized the importance of freely negotiated license
agreements. Because of the overwhelmingly strong policy concerns and the
Supreme Court's implicit endorsement, courts across America should recognize
no-challenge clauses in patent licensing agreements.
Richard Weil Goldstucker
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